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This analysis uses survey data representing three of the world’s most populous Muslim 
majority countries to challenge conventional wisdom on what shapes Muslim public opinion 
on political violence against the United States. It improves previous analysis by clearly 
distinguishing support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military 
targets and by featuring independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign 
policies from views on US culture. Logistic regression shows that, among Egyptian, Pakistani 
and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle 
Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to 
support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but only to support for attacks on US 
military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of 
US freedom of expression, culture, and people, disapproval of the domestic political status 
quo as well as the notion of general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East. This 
last finding has important implications for US and Western policies toward the post-Arab 
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More than a decade after the events of September 11, 2001, investigations of the sources of 
public support for Islamist terrorism are still limited in number and scope when compared 
with the substantial quantitative and qualitative studies of possible root causes of terrorist 
attacks (Berrebi, 2007; Urdal, 2006; Piazza, 2006; Li and Schaub, 2004; Testas, 2004; 
Krueger and Maleckova, 2003).
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 This gap is unfortunate given the dependence of terrorist 
organizations on a minimum level of societal support in their efforts to recruit members and to 
facilitate operational assistance (Sarseloudi, 2005). As Paul Pillar, National Intelligence 
Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, pointed out, ‘(t)he target for 
intelligence is not just proven terrorists; it is anyone who might commit terrorism in the future 
(2004: 115, emphasis in original).’ Since these future terrorists are likely to be recruited from 
among those who sympathize with terrorist attacks in the first place, many academic and 
political observers view reduced public support for terrorism as a central measure of 
successful US counterterrorism efforts (Cronin, 2006; Simon & Martini, 2004; Byman, 2003). 
This examination of Muslim public opinion on terrorist attacks on US civilians and guerilla-
type attacks on US military targets is guided by the broader theoretical debate on the role 
which perceptions of US foreign policies and US culture might play. In particular, it utilizes 
Katzenstein & Keohane’s (2006: 26) important contribution on the manifestations of Anti-
Americanisms which differentiates ‘unfavorable judgments about the United States or its 
policies’ from the deeper resentment of US culture and its people. The firm belief that 
‘America’s identity ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, 
practices and institutions elsewhere in the world’ (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006: 31) sets the 
‘biases’ of such culture-centered Anti-Americanism apart from the ‘opinions’ of policy-
                                                          
1
 This article follows Abrahms (2006), Tessler/Robbins (2007) and Wight (2009) in 
understanding terrorism as violence, or the threat thereof, committed by non-state actors 
against civilians with the aim of altering government policies.  
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centered Anti-Americanism that shares key American values but deplores US failure to act on 
them either at home or abroad. 
Employing independent variables that reflect these long over-due specifications, this article 
shows that negative assessments of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern 
oil or a general sense of US hostility toward the Muslim world only shape public support for 
political violence against US military targets, not against US civilians. Instead, approval of 
9/11-type terrorist attacks on civilians in the United States is only driven by negative views of 
US culture as well as the rejection of the domestic political status quo and perceived US 
hostility to Muslim democracy. 
This article proceeds as follows: The first section briefly reviews the main theoretical 
arguments regarding the possible correlates of public support for Islamist terrorism. The 
second section sets out the benefits and limitations of the present data set and the 
methodology employed for its analysis. The third section presents and discusses the results of 
binomial logistic regression analyses conducted for each country. The final section lays out 
the theoretical and policy implications of this paper’s findings. 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
The post-9/11 debate about what might drive some Muslims to support terrorist attacks 
directed at the United States has primarily been shaped by arguments that point to the 
widespread rejection of US policies and those that emphasize Muslim resentment of what the 
United States represents. In an early assessment that focused on the root causes of terrorist 
engagement, but is also relevant for the debate on possible drivers of Muslim public opinion, 
Stephen Walt saw a combination of both factors at work 
‘At one extreme, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are inspired by an intense 
antipathy toward the United States and its global dominance. Some of this antipathy 
arises from a particular vision of the United States as a corrupt and godless society, but 
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it is also fueled by America's close relationship with Israel, its support for several 
conservative Arab regimes, and its seemingly endless conflict with Iraq (2001/02: 
59).’ 
In its qualification of cultural explanations, Walt’s argument is in line with publications which 
link support for political violence with foreign occupation and perceived US political 
dominance (Pape, 2005; for a critique see Moghadam, 2006) or a general sense of humiliation 
and betrayal emanating from US policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq (Fattah & 
Fierke, 2009).  
This paper seeks to examine the extent to which these possible causes of engagement with 
terrorism are also possibly shaping public support for terrorism. Previous quantitative 
explorations by Tessler & Robbins (2007) as well as Mostafa & al-Hamdi (2007) showed that 
negative views of US foreign policies correlated with greater support for political violence 
against the United States. The following analysis will thus test  
Hypothesis I: Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US 
civilians is associated with negative views of US foreign policies toward the Middle 
East. 
 
Others asked whether Arab governments had to accept at least some responsibility for the rise 
of anti-US violence. Moghaddam (2005), for instance, hypothesized that the perceived 
injustice associated with a lack of options for peaceful participation in decision-making 
constituted the first rung on a five-step ‘staircase toward terrorism’. Indeed, Fawaz Gerges 
(2005) showed how the Arab governments’ crackdown on any form of political opposition 
reinforced the impression among Islamist radicals that the United States should be targeted as 
a means of pressuring it into ending support for its ‘local puppets’. Testas’ statistical analysis 
of terrorist incidents in 37 Muslim countries from 1968 to 1991 (2004) confirmed the 
existence of a U-shaped function, in which repression initially reduces terrorism, but 
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ultimately makes wider public support for political violence more likely. Krueger & Laitin 
(2008) used a US State Department data-set of 785 international terrorist incidents that 
occurred between 1997 and 2002 to show that international terrorism originated in countries 
suffering from political repression and targeted economically successful countries. With 
Tessler & Robbins (2007) reporting that negative views of their own governments are strong 
predictors of support for violence against the United States among Algerians and Jordanians, 
the following analysis will thus test: 
Hypothesis II: Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US 
civilians is associated with rejection of the domestic political status quo. 
 
The notion of an Anti-American hatred that goes beyond a particular US foreign policy found 
its most prominent political expression in President Bush’s widely quoted speech to a joint 
session of Congress shortly after the attacks on New York and Washington, DC he declared 
that  
‘(t)hey hate what we see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government. 
Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our 
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other 
(2001).’  
Such assessments find some support in the writings of Islamist radicals such as Sayyid Qutb, 
who inspired those who would later become involved in al-Qaeda (Shepherd, 2003; Brown, 
2000; Moussalli, 1992; Goldberg, 1991; Kepel, 1985). In one of the letters he wrote during his 
time as an exchange student at the University of the District of Columbia in Washington, DC 
and the University of Northern Colorado, Qutb (2000: 10) stated that: 
‘I fear that a balance may not exist between America’s material greatness and the 
morality of its people. And I fear that the wheel of life will have turned and the book of 
time will have closed and America will have added nothing, or next to nothing, to the 
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account of morals that distinguishes man from object, and indeed, mankind from 
animals.’ 
More recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor as leader of Al-Qaeda, 
called for a ‘holy war’ against the United States in response to an Anti-Islam video, which, as 
he pointed out, was made possible by US freedom of expression (Guardian, 2012). The 
following analysis offers an empirical test of whether anti-Americanism as measured in the 
rejection of US culture help explain support for violence against US civilian and military 
targets. Thus, 
Hypothesis III:  Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US 
civilians is associated with stronger rejection of US culture. 
 
One particular variant of cultural explanations focuses on religion. The Orientalist notion of 
Islam as a crucial independent variable in the analysis of Middle East politics (Halliday, 1993) 
was the hallmark of Samuel P Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ (1996) and Bernard Lewis’ 
‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ (1990). Numerous studies of public opinion data from several 
Arab and Muslim countries failed to detect any direct relation between religious practice or 
identity and the support for violence, international conflict or groups such as the Taliban and 
al Qaeda (Fair, Malhotra & Shapiro, 2012; Mousseau, 2011; Shapiro & Fair, 2009; Tessler & 
Robbins, 2007). On the other hand, Blaydes & Linzer (2012) found religiosity to be positively 
related to Anti-Americanism as measured in negative views of US culture. The final 
hypothesis thus is 
Hypothesis IV:  Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US 
civilians is associated with greater religiosity. 
 
Data and methodology 
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In contrast to previous examinations of Muslim public opinion that have used an ambiguous 
dependent variable (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007), the following 
discussion bases its observations on the statistical analysis of the first data set that sufficiently 
disentangles support for terrorist attacks against civilians from support for guerilla-type 
attacks on military targets. The corresponding surveys were administered in Egypt, Pakistan, 
and Indonesia in summer 2008 as part of a WorldPublicOpinion.org project managed by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and supported by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) at the University of 
Maryland. They were conducted using in-home interviews (1,101 in Egypt; 1,120 in 
Indonesia; 1,200 in Pakistan) covering both urban and rural areas based on multi-stage 
probability sampling. Given the low number of non-Muslims within the samples and this 
paper’s particular interest in Muslim views on political violence against the United States, 
non-Muslim respondents were excluded from this analysis.
2
 
A comparison with recent United Nations (2009) data reveals that all three samples are 
broadly representative in terms of gender, age and education, with an overrepresentation of 
those younger than 30 years (44% in sample versus 31% national average) and an 
underrepresentation of illiterates (20% versus 34%) in Egypt as well as on overrepresentation 
of urban respondents in Pakistan (50% versus 36%) and Indonesia (65% versus 43%). 
A second caveat results from the substantial number of respondents in Pakistan and Indonesia 
who were either unwilling or unable to offer views on US foreign policies and culture (table 
I). As the almost equal number of non-responses to questions about US foreign policies and 
various aspects of US culture suggests, this seems to reflect more a lack of awareness of or 
interest in these issues than concerns about the possibly ‘sensitive’ nature of such questions. 
This interpretation is supported by results of a survey (PEW 2011a) where a question about 
                                                          
2
 There are no substantial differences in the results of regression analyses for the full sample 
and the sample which omits all non-Muslims. 
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views on President Obama’s policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict had a similarly low 
response rate among Pakistanis, but high response rates in all Arab countries. Also, if 
respondents had perceived questions about US foreign policy as too sensitive to be answered 
then we could have expected more missing responses in Egypt than in Indonesia and Pakistan. 
This is because in pre-revolutionary Egypt, the regime and its security services were pursuing 
the most clear-cut anti-Islamist and pro-US agenda out of the three countries. Instead, in all 
three countries, the ability or willingness to offer a view on US foreign policies was 
significantly correlated with educational achievement. The same applied to views on US 
culture in the Egyptian and Pakistani samples (table A1, online appendix).  
 
Insert table I here 
 
Confidence in respondents’ willingness to answer ‘sensitive’ questions is further increased by 
their responses to questions about domestic politics (table I) and personal faith (table A2, 
online appendix) which are as ‘sensitive’ as questions could get in semi-authoritarian or 
newly democratizing Muslim majority countries. The list-wise exclusion of respondents with 
missing responses did not alter the demographic profile of the Egyptian and Indonesian 
samples. The exception was Pakistan where dramatic differences in educational achievement 
between men and women among the general population (Fair, Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2012) 
meant that the exclusion of such cases produced a sample with a substantially lower number 
of female (32%) and illiterate (32%) respondents than in the original sample (50% women; 
43% illiterate). This is line with Krosnick & Milburn’s (1990) finding that women (even if 
controlled for education) and the less-knowledgeable have higher non-response rates than 
men and those more knowledgeable. Concerns about the shortcomings of the Pakistani sample 
are mitigated by the fact that the main findings are, first, similar in the more balanced 
Egyptian and Indonesian samples and, second, confirmed in robustness checks which 
 9 
included those without clear attitudes on the political questions (tables A9, A10, A11, online 
appendix) or featured a dataset (tables A12, A13, online appendix) imputed with the Amelia 
II program (Honaker, King & Blackwell, 2011). 
A final caveat relates to the fact that public opinion surveys in authoritarian countries such as 
Egypt face the problem of possible preference falsification among respondents (Rowley & 
Smith, 2009; Kuran, 1997). Many respondents might have felt uncomfortable with 
straightforward answers to questions about their support for attacks on US civilians or the US 
military. It can therefore not be ruled out that the dependent variables underreport support for 
anti-US violence. With regard to this article’s particular interest in testing whether views on 
US foreign policies or US culture increase support for terrorist attacks on US civilians, the 
problem of preference falsification is mitigated by the fact that linking anti-Western violence 
with complaints about Western policies constitutes the ‘safe’ option in the context of regimes 
that had a strong interest in blaming external forces for (trans-)national problems with 
possible domestic roots (Behr & Berger, 2009). It can therefore be assumed that with 
preference falsification working heavily in favor of detecting the influence of US foreign 
policy, the discovery of other robust predictors would be all the more significant. 
With these caveats in mind, the data set analyzed here offers a number of important 
advantages over previous analyses that employed either exclusively urban (Shafiq & Sinno, 
2010; Furia & Lucas, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Fair & Shepherd, 2006) or Arab 
samples (Haddad & Khashan, 2002; Mostafa & al-Hamdi, 2007; Tessler & Robbins, 2007).  
First, the START survey covered not only three Muslim countries that offer crucial variations 
in terms of, for instance, political system, political culture, socio-economic development and 
dominant interpretations of Islam. Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia were also all described in 
post-Cold War studies of US Grand Strategy as so-called ‘pivotal states’, which deserved 
particular attention because their “fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding 
region and ultimately the stability of the international system (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 
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1996).” In Egypt, the apparent defeat and delegitimization of domestic Islamist terrorism 
coincided with the unrelenting Islamization of the public sphere (Ismail, 2003; Gerges, 2000). 
Apart from a brief period in early 2005, all post-Cold war US administrations had offered 
unquestioned loyalty to the increasingly authoritarian pre-revolutionary regime in Cairo 
(Berger, 2011). Pakistan’s 2008 return to democracy after the third post-independence 
experiment with US-supported military rule occurred against the backdrop of Islam’s strong 
public role (Haqqani, 2004/05). Indonesia’s national pride feeds from its status as the world’s 
fourth most populous nation, its most populous Muslim majority nation and third largest 
democracy (Murphy, 2009). Since 1998, the country has moved away from nearly half a 
century of an ‘authoritarian divide-and-rule’ approach to Islam that some observers accused 
of ‘wreaking havoc’ with the country’s moderate, syncretistic religious traditions (Hefner, 
2005: 297-298). This led President Obama to describe the achievements of Indonesia’s 
‘extraordinary democratic transformation’ as demonstrating that ‘democracy and development 
reinforce each other (2010).’  
Second, the timing of the survey in 2008 offers the advantage of reflecting public sentiment 
after central events such as the US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, Israel’s wars in Gaza 
(2005) and Lebanon (2006) as well as the international boycott of the Hamas government. 
Since all these are widely blamed for having exacerbated Arab/Muslim concerns about US 
foreign policy, the present data constitute a solid base from which to explore possible links 
between support for terrorism and rejection of US foreign policies toward Israel and the wider 
region. The survey does not, obviously, reflect the Arab Spring which only began to reshape 
the Middle East two-and-half years later. At the same time, the Arab world’s quest for 
democratic governance has in many ways only just begun. Associated questions about the 
shape of US support for political reform in this geo-strategically crucial region will thus be of 




The third and most important advantage of the present data set pertains to the availability of 
adequately phrased questionnaire items that produce unambiguous dependent and independent 
variables. In their search for possible correlates of public opinion on terrorism and suicide 
attacks, Bueno de Mesquita (2007), Fair & Shepherd (2006), Mousseau (2011) and Shafiq & 
Sinno (2010) all constructed their dependent variable from responses to the following 
question which the Pew Global attitudes project (for most recent data, see 2011a: 55-56) 
routinely employs:  
‘Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian 
targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, 
no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel 
that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely 
justified, or never justified?’ 
As Bueno de Mesquita (2007: 43) himself warns, the particular wording of this question 
makes it impossible to gauge whether respondents are indicating their support for the 
legitimacy of ‘violence against civilians’, the tactic of ‘suicide bombings’ or the need to 
defend ‘Islam from its enemies’. At first glance, the question Tessler & Robbins (2007) used 
to construct their dependent variable appears more likely to elicit a response that captures 
approval of violence against the United States: 
‘As you may know, after the military campaign in Afghanistan began, some people called 
on all the Muslims to join in armed jihad against the United States. Do you strongly 
support, support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this call to 
armed jihad?’ 
As the following analysis of less ambiguous dependent variables clearly shows, this question 
fails to specify whether the respondent is supposed to think of attacks on US troops in 
Afghanistan which would fall under the definition of guerrilla war, or whether to think of 
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attacks on US civilians in the United States which would fall under most definitions of 
terrorism (Abrahms 2006; Wight, 2009; Hoffman, 2006). In addition, Tessler & Robbins 
combined this question with another one that queried respondents’ feelings about Osama bin 
Laden. This approach is highly problematic because in the Muslim world only minorities are 
convinced that al-Qaeda and thus Bin Laden were responsible for the attacks of 9/11. A 2011 
Pew survey found (2011b: 68), for instance, that only 21% of Egyptians, 20% of Indonesians 
and 12% of Pakistanis believed that ‘Arabs carried out the attacks … on September 11’. 
This present paper circumvents these problems by using the answer to a questionnaire item 
that eschews ambiguous cues (table II):  
‘Thinking about the following kinds of attacks on Americans, please tell me if you 
approve of them, disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them? - Attacks on 
civilians in the United States.’   
 
Insert Table II here 
 
The responses were re-coded into a binary variable where those who approved or strongly 
approved were coded as ‘1’ and those who simply disapproved, disapproved strongly or had 
mixed feelings were coded as ‘0’. This reflects this paper’s particular interest in what sets 
apart those who agree with political violence against the United States from the rest. 
There are a number of theoretical and methodological reasons why separate analysis instead 
of a pooled analysis is warranted. First, focusing on only three countries, this analysis cannot 
aim at drawing conclusions representative of all Muslims. However, given clear differences in 
political, social, cultural, and religious contexts, any consistent pattern across three countries 
makes it more likely that they extend to Muslims in other contexts as well. Second, as the 
descriptive analysis shows, the three countries under consideration vary on a number of key 
variables of interest such as support for political violence and concern about US foreign 
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policies and culture. Using one of the countries as the baseline for a regression analysis of 
pooled data would thus make the interpretation of the findings less clear. 
In order to test whether different predictors achieve statistical significance depending on the 
type of target, the following analysis compares the results of the binomial logistic regression 
of this first dependent variable with the results of a regression analysis of a second dependent 
variable which captures support for ‘attacks on US military troops in Iraq’. This question is 
less ambiguous than the Pew survey question used by Shafiq & Sinno (2010: 151) which 
simply asked respondents about their feelings on ‘suicide bombings carried out against 
Americans and other Westerners in Iraq’ and which did not distinguish between American 
military and civilian targets as well as different nationalities. Table II makes clear just how 
crucial such a distinction is in the eyes of various Muslim publics. Egyptian Muslims, for 
instance, were as unanimous in their rejection of attacking US civilians as they were in 
support of attacks on US military targets. While Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims shared the 
Egyptian disapproval of attacks on civilians in the United States, Europe and those working in 
Islamic countries, they were also much less likely to express support for attacks on US 
military targets. A factor analysis confirmed the existence of two distinct factors representing 
these two different types of targets (table A3, online appendix). Together, these results 
highlight how important the type of target is in shaping Muslim public opinion on anti-US 
violence. They also cast doubt on conclusions drawn from previous analyses which used 
dependent variables that did not reflect this differentiation. 
 
Independent Variables 
The lopsided results in table II mirror those presented in table I which captures respondents’ 
views on items that featured most prominently in the post-9/11 debates outlined above. 
Survey participants were asked whether they believed it was ‘definitely’, ‘probably’, 
‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ a goal of the United States to help Israel expand its 
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geographic borders, control the region’s oil resources, or weaken and divide the Islamic world 
in general. These questions cover a range of themes which feature prominently in the 
conventional wisdom on what might shape Muslim public opinion on anti-US violence as 
well as in the rhetoric which radical Islamists employ in order to attract popular support for 
their violent acts (Lawrence, 2005; Ibrahim, 2007). Among those willing or able to offer their 
assessment, overwhelming majorities of Egyptians, Pakistanis and Indonesians saw the 
United States pursuing policies which many people in the Arab and Muslim world consider as 
threatening or harmful. These results mirror Egyptian, Pakistani, and Indonesian views on 
President Obama’s policies toward conflict between Israelis and Palestinians reported in a 
2011 Pew survey (PEW, 2011a).  
Taken together, tables I and II serve as a first note of caution with respect to claims, captured 
in hypothesis I, that perceptions of US foreign policies are linked to public support for 
political violence against civilians in the United States. The mismatch between the robust 
majorities who claim to see the US pursuing controversial foreign policies and the small 
number of respondents supporting attacks on US civilians constitutes enough of a puzzle to 
warrant examining independent variables outside the narrow confines of conventional 
wisdom. 
In order to test the possible role of domestic politics in the Muslim world (hypothesis II), the 
following models also include variables measuring respondents’ confidence in their national 
government, police, and judiciary (table I). Views on possible US responsibility for this crisis 
of confidence are captured in a question on respondents’ perceptions of US policies toward 
Middle East democracy. In 2008, only half of Egyptians, Pakistanis and Indonesians saw the 
United States as supporting Muslim democracy at least conditionally (table I). Answers were 
recoded into a dummy variable where those who thought that the United States opposed 
Middle East democracy in general were coded as ‘1’ and the other two responses as ‘0’. This 
recoding addresses the problem of a small number of cases among those who saw the US as 
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supporting Middle East democracy in general and serves the analytical interest in measuring 
the possible impact of a general sense of US hostility toward Middle East democracy. 
A dearth of relevant questionnaire items has meant that most of the currently available studies 
had to rely on indirect measures to assess the possible impact of ‘cultural’ factors reflected in 
hypothesis III. The present analysis can make use of an item that specifically asked 
respondents whether they had very favorable, favorable, unfavorable or very unfavorable 
views of US freedom of expression, US culture, and US people (table I). This approach is 
preferable to one that queries attitudes toward Western culture only in the context of the 
widely rejected ‘clash-of-civilization’ thesis (Mostafa & al-Hamdi, 2007). The data presented 
in table I reveal that negative views of US freedom of expression and US culture which 
Katzenstein & Keohane’s (2006) assessment of anti-Americanisms  differentiates from 
negative opinion of US policies extends well beyond a small fringe of Muslim public opinion. 
In all three countries, a majority of respondents had unfavorable views of US culture and US 
people of varying intensity. Similarly, pluralities in Egypt and Pakistan and a majority in 
Indonesia had unfavorable views of US freedom of expression. These results fall broadly in 
line with previous data sets on Muslim public opinion on the United States (BBC, 2003).  
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted with direct oblimin on the attitudinal 
variables represented in tables I. The analysis confirmed the existence of three distinct factors 
which correspond with potential correlates of Muslim public opinion on violence against US 
targets (table A4, online appendix). Factor 1 which captures perceptions of US culture 
explained 22.4% of the variance. Questions about confidence in domestic institutions load 
strongly on factor 2 which explained 19.8% of the variance. Factor 3 which captures 
perceptions of US foreign policies explained 18.3% of the variance. Perceptions of US 
policies toward Middle East democracy do not load strongly on either of these factors. That is 
why the separate inclusion of this variable appears warranted. The independent variables 
listed in table I were thus used to create summative index variables in which higher values 
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reflect lower confidence in domestic institutions, more negative views of US culture and its 
manifestations and the firmer belief that the United States pursues foreign policies detrimental 
to Muslim interests. 
Finally, the present analysis follows Tessler (2002) as well as Shapiro & Fair (2009) by 
employing daily prayer as an indicator of religiosity in a test of hypothesis IV. A dummy 
variable compares those who reported praying five times a day as prescribed for every 
Muslim with those who did not (table A2, online appendix). A robustness check featuring the 
original variable confirmed the results reported below (tables A14 and A15, online appendix). 
 
Controls 
Some of the views captured by this set of independent variables might reflect the socio-
economic costs of a development crisis which features prominently in many analyses of 
Islamist organizations (Ayubi, 1991; Sadowski, 2006). Contrary to Crenshaw’s depiction of 
urbanization as a major permissive cause for the modern phenomenon of terrorism (1981), 
Urdal (2006) did not find the urban-rural divide to be of statistical significance in explaining 
the outbreak of political violence. Yet, Mousseau (2011) found that Muslim urban poor were 
more likely to support suicide bombings in the name of defending Islam. 
The image of an unmarried male in his twenties as the typical profile of someone looking for 
social recognition and belonging in a terrorist group has received some empirical 
substantiation with several studies linking younger age to higher support for terrorism (Bueno 
de Mesquita, 2007; Tessler & Robbins, 2007; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Haddad & Khashan, 
2002). The empirical evidence on a possible link between age and negative views of the 
United States, however, is less clear with some studies showing a positive relationship 
(Blaydes & Linzer, 2012; Carlson & Nelson, 2008) and others showing a negative 
relationship (Harmaneh, 2005). Similarly, Carlson & Nelson’s (2008) finding that higher 
education was linked to more negative views of the US contrasts with the findings that greater 
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wealth and higher educational achievement were all associated with less negative views of US 
culture and technology across 20 Muslim countries (Blades & Linzer, 2012). 
In order to test the possible influence of socio-economic variables, the following models 
contain binary variables comparing urban and rural respondents, women and men, singles and 
those who are married or widowed, those aged 30 and above with those aged 29 and younger, 
those who achieved at least high school degree with those who did not complete secondary 
education, and those with at least average income with those on low or very-low incomes 
(table A2, online appendix). Robustness checks with original variables or different cut-off 
points did not offer different results (table A15, online appendix).  
 
Analysis 
The results reported in table III show that, in striking contrast to hypothesis I and confirming 
hypothesis III, greater support for attacks on US civilians is not correlated with negative 
views on US foreign policies in any of the countries under investigation, but with negative 
views on US culture and its manifestations in all three of them.  
 
Insert Table III here 
 
The impact of the perceptions of US culture becomes even more plastic through the 
calculation of predicted probabilities. For example, for an unmarried man, younger than 30 
years of age, living in an urban area with incomplete school and below average income who 
prays five times a day, the probability of endorsing terrorist attacks on US civilians stands at 
1.4% if he has very positive views on all dimensions of US culture in Egypt, 7.4% in 
Pakistan, and 1.5% in Indonesia. This probability increases to 9.3% in Egypt (from 4.3% to 
24.6% if does not pray five times a day), to 23.4% in Pakistan, and to 16.2% in Indonesia if 
he has very negative views on all dimensions of US culture. 
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The total lack of influence of perceptions of US foreign policies in the civilian model 
contrasts sharply with the military model (table IV). There, support for attacks on US military 
targets correlates with negative views on US foreign policies in all three countries. The 
probability of endorsing an attack on US troops in Iraq among those with highly positive 
views on US foreign policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, and the broader Islamic world 
stands at 64.2% in Egypt,18.3% in Pakistan, and 16.5% in Indonesia. It increases to 92.7% in 
Egypt, 51.3% in Pakistan, and 41.1% in Indonesia if the respondent holds very negative views 
on these US foreign policies. Only in Indonesia did perceptions of US culture also correlate 
with approval of attacks on US troops with the likelihood of endorsing such violence 
increasing from 15.9% for those who viewed all aspects of US culture positively to 42.2% for 
those who viewed all negatively. 
 
Insert Table IV here 
 
Robustness checks which used approval of attacks on US civilians working for US companies 
in the Islamic world and approval of attacks on civilians in Europe, US troops in Afghanistan 
and US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf as dependent variables (tables A5, A6, A7, A8, 
online appendix) confirmed the finding that perceptions of US foreign policies only correlate 
with approval of attacks on military targets, but not with approval of attacks on US civilians. 
In addition, robustness checks which compared those who had negative attitudes in table I 
with those who had either positive or no views (tables A9, A10, A11, online appendix) as well 
as robustness tests run on a dataset imputed via Amelia II (Honaker, King, Blackwell 2011, 
tables A12, A13 online appendix) confirmed the consistent, cross-country impact of 
perceptions of US culture in the civilian model and the consistent, cross-country impact of 
perceptions of US foreign policies in the military model. Classification tables and ROC curve 
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results demonstrate the ability of the two models to predict support for violence against 
civilians and military targets (tables A16, A17, A18, online appendix). 
All this shows how crucial the differentiation between different types of targets is in terms of 
assessing the factors that influence corresponding Muslim public opinion. These results offer 
further empirical validation of Katzenstein & Keohane’s (2006) distinction between criticisms 
of particular US foreign policies and the outright rejection of what the United States 
represents. Perceptions of hostile US policies only correlate with greater support for attacks 
on what might be seen as instruments of these policies, i.e. military targets. The fringe 
position of endorsing attacks on US civilians is more likely to be adopted by those whose 
negative views extend beyond US policies and into US culture and its symbols. 
Quite remarkably, in pre-revolutionary Egypt, skeptical views of US democracy promotion 
correlated with greater support for both types of political violence. If a respondent held this 
view, the likelihood of him endorsing violence against US civilians increased from 3.6% to 
12.2% in Egypt and from 5.2% to 9.9% in Indonesia, and against US military targets from 
82.7% to 91.0% in Egypt. This pattern is somehow mirrored with the variable measuring 
confidence in national institutions which exhibits a statistical association with greater support 
for both forms of political violence against the United States in Indonesia. There, the 
probability of endorsing attacks against US civilians increases from 2.4% if the respondent 
has high confidence in Indonesian government, police and judiciary to 10.8% if he has not 
confidence whatsoever in these three institutions and against US military targets from 9.1% to 
57.8%. In Egypt, this relationship is only noticeable with regard to the likelihood of 
supporting attacks on US civilians where those who viewed positively their domestic political 
institutions (1.8%) differed from those with negative views (7.4%). In Pakistan, a country 
that, at the time of the survey, was experiencing a US-supported transition away from military 
dictatorship under Pervez Musharraf, no such pattern was discernible (tables III and IV). The 
strong support for hypothesis II in the cases of Egypt and Indonesia offers confirmation of 
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similar findings made by Tessler & Robins (2007: 32) regarding the role which an ‘intolerable 
political status quo’ played in increasing support for political violence against the United 
States among Algerians and Jordanians.  
The dramatic political implications of this finding are underscored by the Egyptian military’s 
forceful removal of Egypt’s first freely and democratically elected, yet increasingly 
authoritarian and anti-liberal, President Morsi in July 2013. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman az-
Zawahiri tried to instrumentalize the crisis by calling upon his global audience to unite in the 
face of what he described as ‘American plotting’ (Tawfeeq, 2013). More moderate Islamist 
voices warned that many supporters and sympathizers of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
and affiliated organizations across the Arab world could (again) see the engagement with 
democratic processes, as opposed to more radical pursuits of their political agendas, as futile 
in light of detrimental US policies. Amr Darrag, minister of planning and international 
cooperation under President Mohammed Morsi, described the increasing perception that  
‘American rhetoric on democracy is empty; that American politicians won’t hesitate to 
flout their own laws or subvert their declared values for short-term political gains; and 
that when it comes to freedom, justice and human dignity, Muslims need not apply 
(Darrag, 2013).’ 
The prominent role which the predictor capturing attitudes toward US culture and its various 
manifestations played in explaining support for violence against US civilians should not be 
conflated with a resounding confirmation of Orientalist stereotypes as posited in hypothesis 
IV. Indeed, Orientalist determinism cannot explain why the most widely used measure of 
Muslim religiosity has the opposite impact in Egypt and Pakistan in the civilian model and no 
statistically significant impact in the military model (tables III and IV). Earlier findings about 
the pacifying role of religiosity in the Muslim world find confirmation in the case of Egypt 
where those who claim to adhere to the Islamic precept of five daily prayers (3.7%) are 
substantially less likely to support terrorism against US civilians than those who did not 
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(10.8%). This might reflect the fact that a series of authoritarian military-led regimes had 
ensured that religious authorities at Cairo’s prestigious Al-Azhar University would not openly 
challenge the foreign policies pursued by secular political elites (Moustafa, 2000). The 
relationship is the reverse in Pakistan where radical interpretations of Islam emanating from 
the Arab world have gained influence since the 1980s (Haqqani, 2004/05). Here, the 
probability of a respondent endorsing attacks on civilians in the United States increases from 
4.3% if he does not pray five times a day to 13.5% if he does. The lack of a pattern in 
Indonesia is in line with an earlier study by Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan (2009) who did 
not find a link between prayer and willingness to engage in religiously inspired political 
violence. Together, these results reaffirm the need to investigate the cultural and political 
influence of specific religious discourses as opposed to general platitudes concerning the 
supposedly peaceful or violent nature of religions. 
Finally, the models confirm earlier findings about the limited effect of socio-economic 
variables with only Pakistani women (19.4%) less likely to support violence in the case of US 
troops in Iraq than men (32.9%) (table IV).  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis offered a more nuanced understanding of variables shaping Muslim public 
opinion on terrorist attacks on US civilians and guerilla attacks against US military targets. 
Whether or not the insights into public opinion presented here can also be applied to the study 
of possible root causes of sub-state anti-US violence is, obviously, a question for separate 
analysis. 
The stark differences in the relative influence of perceptions of US foreign policies and US 
culture between models that explain support for terrorist attacks on civilians and models 
explaining support for guerilla attacks on US troops corroborate previous calls to 
unmistakably distinguish between these two forms of political violence (Abrahms, 2006). It 
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has become clear that previous analyses purporting to provide evidence for a link between 
support for political violence against US civilians and perceptions of US foreign policies 
rested on misspecifications of dependent and independent variables, which blurred the lines 
between violence against US civilians and violence against US military targets and failed to 
appropriately control for the effects of anti-Americanism that rejects US culture. This 
highlights the need to pay closer attention to issues of concept equivalence and possible cues 
in the wording of future public opinion surveys on these topics.  
Previous analyses have often relied on data where, in light of the findings presented here, it 
remains doubtful whether individual variables constituted an exact measure of respondents’ 
support for various forms of political violence against the United States. If Muslim 
respondents understand that they are supposed to indicate support for violence against US 
civilians as opposed to attacks on members of the US military, US foreign policy only plays a 
role with regard to perceived US support for governments that do not enjoy the confidence of 
their citizens. This means that surveys and corresponding analyses that fail to take this into 
account will continue to mistakenly report the significance of widely editorialized US policies 
toward Israel or Middle Eastern oil in the case of attacks on US civilians, when their strong 
impact is limited to approval of attacks on US military targets. The findings presented here 
make clear that radical Islamists face more difficulties in turning (perceived) political 
indignation at the hands of the United States into support for terrorist attacks on US civilians 
than many journalistic and academic accounts assume. As the models presented above clearly 
show, support for violence against civilians in the United States remains mostly limited to a 
version of anti-Americanism that believes that ‘the West, and the United States in particular, 
are so incorrigibly bad that they must be destroyed (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006: 31).’ 
It is important to point out that the findings on the role of US freedom of expression do not 
confirm Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. This is because, as a related result, 
religious practice has a more ambiguous impact than Orientalist reductionism stipulates. The 
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different strengths and directions the corresponding parameters exhibit across models and 
countries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the role of specific religious 
discourses. These multifaceted findings might disappoint those looking for a general pattern 
of religious influence. They do, however, correspond with other studies (Collins & Owen, 
2012) which showed that among Muslims religiosity can indeed influence views on salient 
political issues, but that, contrary to essentialist viewpoints, this influence varies depending on 
the specific political context. The present results thus strengthen the arguments of 
constructivist scholars who have for a long time emphasized that religion’s escalating or 
deescalating role depends on which reading of the holy texts is culturally dominant at any 
given time (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). Further in-depth quantitative and qualitative 
analysis is therefore required to explain which factors bolster the societal relevance of 
particular interpretations of religion. 
Second, the rejection of US culture is not a prerogative of any single cultural context. Ceaser 
(2003: 4) provides a long list of examples from European history that demonstrates the idea 
that ‘something at the core of American life is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the 
world’ is not unique to the Arab or Muslim world. Indeed, Chiozza (2009) showed that among 
publics in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Russia negative views of the American 
people shaped the formation of negative views of the United States in the context of the Iraq 
war more than any other factor.  
This study confirms the at best limited influence of demographic and socio-economic 
variables such as gender and educational achievement, with the urban-rural divide and marital 
status playing no role at all. It does, however, highlight the noticeable impact of alienation 
from domestic political institutions and the perception that the United States supports those 
deemed responsible for the ongoing domestic political and social malaise. These findings 
have crucial implications for US policies toward the dramatic events unfolding in the Arab 
world since late 2010. It provides further empirical evidence to Wintrobe’s (2006) argument 
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that authoritarian regimes are more likely to produce terrorists by suppressing dissent and 
through the failure to provide public goods. As James B Steinberg who later served as Hilary 
Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of State already remarked in 2002,  
‘(…) in the long run, terrorist networks will reconstitute themselves unless we make it 
harder for them to recruit new members and sustain their activities. This means 
helping to build stable, prosperous, democratic societies in countries that have seen too 
little of all three, particularly in the Arab world, Africa, and parts of Central, South, 
and Southeast Asia (2002).’  
This investigation into variables associated with Muslim public support for anti-US violence 
reaffirms the urgency of this task. 
 
Data replication 
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at 
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Models have been produced using SPSS and Amelia II. 
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Table I. Attitudes toward US and domestic politics 
 
US goals in the 
Middle East (%) 




















borders of Israel Pakistan 31 21 4 2 41 
Control oil 













Middle East Pakistan 45 17 5 3 30 
Weaken and 













Islamic world Pakistan 56 19 4 3 17 
       
Confidence in 
(%) 
 Great deal Quite a lot Not very 
much 
None at all Don’t 
know 
National  Egypt 29 30 20 20 2 
government Indonesia 17 46 34 3 1 
 Pakistan 14 30 29 21 7 
Local police Egypt 33 35 19 13 1 
 Indonesia 16 49 32 2 1 
 Pakistan 13 31 28 24 5 
Justice system Egypt 41 31 13 13 3 
 Indonesia 11 33 46 8 2 
 Pakistan 16 30 28 17 9 
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Table I. continued 
 












US culture Egypt 12 16 6 56 10 
 Indonesia 1 8 47 38 6 
 Pakistan 6 6 16 39 34 
US freedom of Egypt 27 14 5 44 10 
expression Indonesia 4 16 44 25 11 
 Pakistan 10 12 12 31 35 
US people Egypt 6 19 7 59 10 
 Indonesia 3 22 47 12 17 
 Pakistan 6 14 16 32 32 
 
The United States (%) Egypt Indonesia Pakistan 
Supports democracy in general 7 9 10 
Favors democracy, but only if government is cooperative 
with US 
42 42 35 
Opposes democracy in Muslim countries 38 24 25 
Don’t Know 13 26 30 



















Civilians  Egypt 8 1 3 6 78 5 
in United States Indonesia 2 4 10 29 38 17 
 Pakistan 3 6 15 17 38 21 
Civilians in Europe Egypt 6 1 3 6 79 5 
 Indonesia 2 3 10 29 38 17 
 Pakistan 4 5 17 16 34 24 
U.S. civilians  Egypt 6 1 3 6 78 5 
working for U.S. Indonesia 3 4 13 31 33 16 
companies in Pakistan 5 7 18 16 30 24 
Islamic countries        
U.S. military troops 






















U.S. military troops  Egypt 77 8 1 2 7 6 
in Iraq Indonesia 14 16 17 15 19 19 
 Pakistan 14 12 22 7 24 21 























N: Egypt=1041; Indonesia=967; Pakistan=1131, Muslims Only 
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Table III. Binomial regression analysis of  
support of attacks on civilians in the United States 







































































US opposes Middle East 

































N 735  420  435  
Cox/Snell .110  .061  .072  
Nagelkerke .216  .105  .142  
Chi square 85.517***  26.517**  32.506**  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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Table IV. Binomial regression analysis of support of attacks on US troops in Iraq 
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N 732  416  437  
Cox/Snell .029  .067  .115  
Nagelkerke .066  .090  .154  
Chi square 21.539*  28.788**  53.312***  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
 
